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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀects of school vouchers in Chile, which adopted a nationwide school
voucher program 28 years ago. Chile has a relatively unregulated, decentralized, competitive
market in primary and secondary education and therefore provides a unique setting in which
to study how voucher programs aﬀect school choice as well as educational attainment and la-
bor market outcomes. This paper develops and estimates a dynamic model of schooling and
work decisions using data from the 2002 Historia Laboral y Seguridad Social and the 2004
Enquesta Proteccion Social (EPS) surveys. The dataset includes rich demographic informa-
tion as well as contemporaneous and retrospective schooling and work information covering a
thirty-five year time frame. Some individuals in the sample completed their schooling before
the voucher program was introduced, while others had the option of using the vouchers over
part or all of their schooling careers. The impacts of the voucher program are identified
from the diﬀerences in the schooling and work choices made and wage returns received by
individuals diﬀerentially exposed to the program. Simulations based on the estimated dy-
namic model indicate that the school voucher program induced individuals aﬀected by the
program to attend private subsidized schools at a higher rate, achieve higher educational
attainment, receive higher wages and participate more in the labor force. Returns to both
public and private education increased after the introduction of vouchers. An examination
of distributional eﬀects shows that the voucher program benefitted individuals from both
poor and non-poor backgrounds, but that the non-poor experienced greater benefits.
1 Introduction
School vouchers were first proposed by Milton Friedman (1962) as a way of improving quality
of schooling. Friedman supported a role for government in the funding of schooling, but
he argued that schooling might be more eﬃciently provided in the private sector. At first,
his voucher proposal was considered a radical idea and was not seriously considered as a
policy alternative, but school vouchers have since garnered support among policy-makers
looking for ways to improve school quality. Recent advocates of voucher programs point
to their value in fostering competition among schools, which is thought to generate quality
improvements in both public and private school systems, and to their potential value in
promoting equality of educational opportunity (Brighouse, 2000, Rouse, 1998, Hoxby, 2001,
2003). However, critics caution that voucher programs deplete already poorly funded public
school systems of revenue, of their best students and possibly also of their best teachers and
therefore may increase inequality (e.g., Ladd, 2002).
School voucher programs have been implemented in some U.S. cities, including Milwau-
kee, Dayton, New York City, the District of Columbia, Cleveland, and Denver and also in
the state of Florida. Most of the existing programs are available only to children from low
income families and/or from poor performing schools.1 The evidence on the eﬀectiveness
of these programs in improving child test scores is mixed. (See, e.g., Krueger and Zhu,
2004, Yau, 2004, Peterson, Howell and Greene, 1999 and section two of this paper). The
small-scale of most programs and their selective targeting makes it diﬃcult to draw inference
about the likely eﬀects of vouchers were they to be adopted on a broader scale. Notably,
the scale of existing programs has been too small to induce a supply response in the private
schooling sector, which one would expect to occur with wider adoption. There are also no
empirical studies for the U.S. or other countries of the potential long-term eﬀects of voucher
programs on educational attainment, earnings and employment outcomes.
This paper studies the eﬀects of school vouchers in Chile, which adopted a nationwide
1The Cleveland program is an exception.
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school voucher program in 1980. The voucher program was one of several market-oriented
reforms initiated under Augusto Pinochet’s military regime. At the time of the voucher pro-
gram’s adoption, Chilean economic and social policy was strongly influenced by the Chicago
school of economics. (Valdez, 1995) The design of Chile’s voucher program is in many ways
similar to Friedman’s original proposal, with public financing of vouchers, voucher funds
following the child to selected schools, coexistence of a government and private schooling
sector with free entry in the private schooling sector, and some government monitoring of
the quality of all schools. Since 1980, Chile has been a virtual laboratory for a relatively
unregulated, decentralized, competitive market in primary and secondary education. It pro-
vides a unique setting in which to study how voucher programs aﬀect school choice and to
examine their longer-term eﬀects on educational attainment and labor market outcomes.
This paper also explores how school vouchers aﬀect inequality by increasing the opportuni-
ties for children from poorer families to attend private schools and/or by changing the types
of private schools attended by children from wealthier families.
Education in Chile is provided by three types of schools: municipal schools, private
subsidized schools, and private non-subsidized (fee-paying) schools. Until 1994 (and over
the time period covered by our data), private subsidized schools and municipal schools were
financed primarily through the per capita government voucher given to every child.2 Private
non-subsidized schools, which include both religious (mainly Catholic) and lay schools, are
financed from private tuition. Private subsidized schools can be for profit or not for profit,
while private nonsubsidized schools are usually for profit. Parents are free to choose among
both municipal and both types of private schools. Private schools can be selective in their
admissions, while public schools are only allowed to be selective if there is excess demand.
At all types of schools, students are required to take standardized tests in the 4th, 8th and
10th grades, called the SIMCE tests. The school’s average test results are published annually
and are used by parents as an indicator of educational performance.
2Municipal schools may also receive some additional funding in the form of government transfers when
the voucher amounts are not suﬃcient to cover operating expenses. In 1993, there was a change in rules to
allow public and private schools to impose a small tuition charge on top of the voucher.
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Figure 1 shows the percentage of students attending diﬀerent kinds of schools from 1981-
2004.3 In the first five years after the voucher program was introduced, the percentage of
students enrolled in private subsidized schools increased rapidly, from 15% to over 30%, with
a corresponding decline in enrollment in public schools. Subsequently, the share of private
subsidized schools continued to increase at a more gradual pace and the corresponding market
share of public schools to decrease. The market share of private nonsubsidized schools varied
only a little over time, ranging from 5.5 to 9.5%.
There are a number of previous studies of the eﬀects of voucher programs in Chile. All
of the studies (e.g. Sapelli and Vial, 2002, Contreras, 2001, Hsieh and Urquiola, 2005, McE-
wan and Carnoy, 2001), analyze the relationship between standardized test scores (usually
SIMCE test scores) and attendance at voucher schools using data collected at the schools.
With data collected in school, one encounters multiple selection problems, namely, that the
children/youth attending each type of school are self-selected and that test scores are only
observed for those who attend school and not for drop-outs. Section two discusses some
of the ways that literature has addressed selectivity problems in analyzing the eﬀects of
vouchers on tests scores. Some studies in the literature find little diﬀerence in test score
performance between municipal and private subsized schools after controlling for family
background (e.g., Mizala and Romaguera, 1997). As they note, however, the available test
score data were collected many years after the introduction of the voucher reform, and the
finding of no significant diﬀerence in test scores between municipal and private subsidized
schools is consistent with the voucher program having improved performance in both the
private and public sectors. Other studies in the literature, such as McEwan and Carnoy
(1999), Bravo, Contreras and Sanhueza (1999), and Sapelli and Vial (2002) do find evidence
of better performance in private schools.
Rather than study the determinants of test scores, this paper uses household survey data
to analyze the longer term eﬀects of school vouchers on educational attainment, employment,
and earnings outcomes. In particular, we use the newly available, longitudinal survey in Chile
3The figure is based on data from the Ministry of Education.
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called the Enquesta Proteccion Social (EPS) which elicited information from respondents
on the types of primary and secondary schools they attended.4 These data, collected in
2002 and 2004, contain rich labor market, demographic and pension-related information.
Most relevant for our analysis is the information that was collected on the types of primary
and secondary schools attended, the geographic location of the schools attended, family
background, work history and earnings. The data cover a random sample of Chileans age 15
and older. The sample includes individuals who attended school prior to the introduction
of vouchers, who were in the midst of their schooling careers at the time vouchers were
introduced and who attended solely in the post-voucher regime. The thirty five year time
frame covered by our data permits evaluation of the eﬀects of the school voucher program
on longer term educational and labor market outcomes, a question that has never been
previously examined.
This paper develops and implements a behavioral model of decision-making about school-
ing and labor force participation over the life-cycle. The model builds on a very rich labor
literature that analyzes labor market outcomes in the presence of self-selection into educa-
tional and/or occupational sectors. The seminal paper is that of Roy (1951), which explores
the implications of occupational self-selection for earnings distributions within a static earn-
ings optimization model.5 Rosen and Willis (1979) extend the Roy model to an educational
choice setting where individuals choose whether to attend college, basing their decisions on
expected lifetime earnings, on financing capacities that diﬀer by family background and on
nonpecuniary benefits of education. The model also builds on the Heckman and Sedlacek
(1985) study of earnings distributions when individuals self-select into diﬀerent economic sec-
tors with the option of remaining out of the labor force. In our context, individuals select
among diﬀerent schooling sectors, representing the three schooling types, and make decisions
about how long to attend school and whether to participate in the labor force. Our model-
4The first round of data were collected under the survey name Historia Laboral y Seguridad Social (HLLS).
These data were collected by the Microdata Center at the University of Chile, under the leadership of David
Bravo, with cofunding from an NIH grant to Petra Todd at the University of Pennsylvania.
5Heckman and Honore (1990) exposit the mathematical foundations for the Roy model and generalize it
to nonnormal distributions.
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ing framework explicitly controls for both observed and unobserved sources of heterogeneity
that may aﬀect selection into diﬀerent types of schools as well as wage oﬀers and preference
parameters. Along the lines of Ben-Porath (1967), Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Heckman
and Navarro (2005), our conceptualization of the schooling decision and of the wage oﬀer
equation assumes that individuals forgo earnings opportunities during periods of schooling
investment, that they are motivated to undertake investments in part by anticipated future
returns, and that wage oﬀers represent a price paid to the human capital embodied in a
person.6 In the tradition of Behrman and Birdsall (1983) and Card and Krueger (1992a,b),
we allow the returns to schooling depend on the quality of schooling provided. Specifically,
the returns diﬀer depending on the types of primary and secondary school attended and on
whether attendance took place in the pre or post voucher regime. This allows the voucher
system to have potentially altered the quality of schooling provided in both the private and
public sectors.
The model we estimate allows components of future wage oﬀers and of the payoﬀs to
diﬀerent types of schooling to be unknown at the time individuals make schooling and labor
market decisions. It also incorporates permanent unobservable heterogeneity, in the form of
discrete types, that is assumed to be known to the agent but unknown to the econometrician
(Heckman and Singer, 1984). Labor market experience accumulates endogeneously as a
function of past labor supply choices. Identification of voucher eﬀects comes from diﬀerences
in the choices made and wage returns received by individuals diﬀerentially exposed to the
voucher program during their schooling careers. The model is estimated solely on males to
avoid consideration of fertility choices.
The estimated behavioral model is used it to assess how the introduction of school vouch-
ers aﬀected school choice, educational attainment, earnings and labor market participation.
By simulating schooling and labor supply choices over the life-cycle with and without vouch-
ers, we directly evaluate the cumulative eﬀects of the voucher program as it operates through
6Also see Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd (1996, 1997) for further discussion of the human capital
pricing interpretation of the wage equation.
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schooling and labor market channels. The empirical findings show that school vouchers in-
crease the likelihood of attending private subsidized schools and lower the probability of
attending other types of schools (municipal and private nonsubsidized) at the primary level.
They also lower the likelihood of attending municipal schools at the secondary level. With
vouchers, individuals achieve higher educational attainment levels and higher high school and
college graduation rates. The wage parameter estimates indicate that returns to schooling
are lowest in municipal schoolings and highest in the private nonsubsidized schools. Returns
to both public and private primary schooling increase subsequent to the introduction of the
voucher program, which is consistent with increased competition having improved the qual-
ity of both public and private education. The gap in returns to private and public schools
narrows after the voucher program. Individual wage oﬀers are higher with the voucher
program, both because completed education levels are higher and returns to schooling are
higher. When individuals are young, there is no observed eﬀect of the voucher program
on labor force participation, because the increased incentive to work stemming from higher
wage oﬀers is counterbalanced by delayed entry in the workforce due to longer terms of
schooling. However, after age 25, we observe that the higher wage oﬀers stimulate labor
force participation. Overall, we find that the voucher program increased wages of workers
on average by 7%.
The paper develops as follows. Second two discusses the existing literature and some of
the results of previous studies of the Chilean voucher program. Section three describes the
model and section four the estimation approach. Section five presents the empirical results
and section six concludes.
2 Background and Related Literature
Although there has been much speculation and debate about the likely short-run and longer-
term eﬀects of large scale school voucher programs in the U.S. on students and teachers, (e.g.
Neal, 2002, Hoxby, 2002, 2003, Ferreyra, 2002), the empirical evidence is still scarce. Much
of what we know about school vouchers comes from small-scale studies examining the short-
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term eﬀects of privately funded voucher programs on student test scores (e.g., Rouse,1998,
Krueger and Zhu 2003, Yau 2004). For example, Howell and Peterson (2002) and Peterson,
Howell, Wolf and Campbell (2003) describe the results of evaluations of voucher programs
in Dayton, OH, New York City, and Washington, D.C. Each of the programs was evaluated
using a randomized design in which families who applied to participate in the program and
met the eligibility criteria where randomized into treatment or control groups. The treatment
group received a voucher that partly covered tuition at a private school. A baseline test
score was collected along with three years of follow-up test scores. Howell and Peterson
(2002) find that African-America children in the treatment group experienced statistically
significant test score gains, but do not find significant gains for white or Hispanic children.
There remains some controversy regarding their results, in part because of high attrition
rates in the experimental control and treatment groups that may have compromised the
comparability of the treatment and comparison groups.
A related U.S. literature studies the eﬀects of attending private schools or Catholic schools
on student test scores and graduation rates (e.g. Neal, 1997, Grogger and Neal, 2000,
Evans and Schwab, 1995). That literature typically find statistically significant positive
eﬀects of attending private schools, primarily for urban, African American and Hispanic
children/youth. Voucher programs facilitate attendance at private schools, so the evidence
on the eﬀects of private schools could be viewed as broadly supportive of voucher programs,
at least to the extent that urban, minority youth seem to benefit from private schooling.
There have been several studies of the Chilean voucher program’s eﬀects on student test
scores. As noted in the introduction, all of the test score data were gathered long after
the voucher reforms took place and are therefore not informative about the performance of
public/private schools in the absence of vouchers. Nevertheless, these studies are informative
on whether attendance at private schools in the post-voucher reform period is associated with
higher test scores. With test score data, one also encounters multiple selection problems,
primarily that the types of children attending each school are self-selected and, for older
children, that test scores are usually unavailable for children not attending school. For
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example, if voucher programs induce people to stay in school longer, then not accounting
for selectivity in school-going could bias the estimated eﬀects on test scores. Sapelli and
Vial (2002) deal with the first selection problem within a static Roy model framework that
explicitly models the choice between types of schools in a way that allows for both observed
and unobservable sources of heterogeneity. They focus their analysis on second graders for
whom the second selection problem (drop-outs) is not severe. Their study finds important
gains associated with attendance at private subsidized schools that are largest for those
attending those types of schools.7 They also find that the relative performance of private
and municipal schools depends on whether municipal schools receive additional government
subsidies. In areas where the municipal schools do not receive extra subsidies, there is a
significant test score gain from attending private subsidized schools.
Hsieh and Urquiola (2005) also consider the question of whether the Chilean voucher
program resulted in better school performance. Their identification strategy compares com-
munities that experienced a greater increase in private school enrollment to those that ex-
perienced less of an increase. Using community level data, they find that average standard
test scores did not rise faster in communities where the private sector enrollment expanded
more, and that average repetition and grade-for-age actually worsened in such areas relative
to other communities.8
McEwan and Carnoy (2001) examine the relationship between average fourth grade
SIMCE school test scores and the percentage of total enrollment in private schools at the
community level (for the period 1988-1996), which they interpret as a measure of school
competition. Their study finds that public schools that faced more competition had lower
average test scores, mainly because of the mobility of the better students to private schools.
They also find that non-religious voucher schools are no more eﬀective than public schools,
whereas Catholic voucher schools are more eﬀective. They document that average per pupil
7They investigate both the eﬀect of treatment on the treatment (TT) and the average treatment eﬀect
(ATE).
8A potential limitation of the analysis is that it examines diﬀerences in test scores over time, though the
tests were not comparable over time prior to 1998, when test equating was introduced.
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expenditure is lower in private schools than in public schools, suggesting that these schools
are more eﬃcient even if they do not improve relative performance. August and Valen-
zuela (2003) also analyze the relationship between test scores (in the year 2000) and school
competition, using an instrumental variables approach where community population and
distance to the closest city serve as instruments for competition. They find positive eﬀects
of competition on average test scores.
McEwan (2001) examines the eﬀects of attendance at a public or private voucher school
on test score outcomes, using individual level data for eighth graders and using a control
function approach to account for selectivity into type of school. He finds no important dif-
ferences in achievement between public and non-religious voucher schools, but that Catholic
voucher schools exhibit a small advantage in test scores over most public schools. Using
fourth grade achievement test scores, averaged at the school level, Mizala and Romaguera
(2000) and Bravo, Contreras and Sanhueza (1999) examine the gap in test score performance
between municipal subsidized private schools and conclude that the test score gap is small
or nonexistent after controlling for geographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Lastly,
Tokman (2002) examines the relationship between primary school test scores and type of
school, allowing the impact of attending private schools to diﬀer by average socioeconomic
status (using school-level data). Her results indicate that public schools are neither uniformly
worse nor better than private schools. Rather, public schools appear to be relatively more
eﬀective for students from disadvantaged family backgrounds, which is a finding reminiscent
of Neal (1997) for U.S. Catholic schools.
Although most of the studies on vouchers in Latin America have focused on Chile, there
is a small literature on related programs elsewhere in Latin America. Angrist et al. (2002)
evaluate the impact in selected Colombian cities of the Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura
de la Educación Secundaria (PACES) voucher program. The vouchers were introduced in
1991, covered about one-half the cost of private secondary schools, and were renewable with
satisfactory academic performance. Evaluation of the PACES program was facilitated by
the fact that vouchers were initially awarded by lottery in some municipalities with excess
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demand for them. Angrist et. al. (2002) did not find any significant impact of vouchers on
enrollment but do find significant positive impacts on grade progression rates, educational
attainment after three years, and on standardized test scores.
The most prominent and most-studied recent related educational policies elsewhere in
Latin American have been the conditional cash transfer programs that provide scholarships
for primary and secondary school enrollment for children from poor families. The most well-
known of these programs is the Mexican Oportunidades anti-poverty and human resource
development program, formerly known as the PROGRESA program. The educational im-
pacts are studied in Schultz (2000,2004), Behrman, Sengupta and Todd 2005, Behrman,
Parker and Todd 2006, Todd and Wolpin 2007, and Attanasio, Meghir and Santiago (2001).
These papers generally find positive impacts of school subsidy programs on school enrollment
and educational attainment.
3 Model
We next describe the dynamic schooling and labor force participation model estimated in
this paper. It assumes that the decision process starts at age 6, when parents are assumed
to choose the type of primary schooling attended by their child to maximize the child’s
lifetime utility. The three choices are public municipal (M), private subsidized (S), or
private unsubsidized (NS). We assume that once a choice of primary school type is made
there is no switching to a diﬀerent type, in part because the data only record one type of
primary and secondary school attended. All children are assumed to attend school through
the 2nd grade, which is true in the data. In subsequent years, they decide whether to continue
attending school or drop out. Children under the age of 16 are not allowed to work, so if
they do not attend school they are assumed to be at home.
At age 14, there is a schooling decision about what type of secondary school to attend,
with the same three options. Individuals can choose a secondary school type that is either
the same or diﬀerent from their primary school type. They incur a cost of transitioning from
primary to secondary school that depends on the type of secondary school in relation to the
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type of primary school. This cost can be thought of as capturing costs of transferring from
one school system to another, facing a new environment, having to make new friends, and
possibly having to travel longer distances to get to a secondary school (since there are more
primary schools than secondary schools). Individuals who complete 12 years of school make
a choice of whether to attend college. If they choose to attend college, they make a choice
each year about whether to keep attending for up to five years. We assume that once an
individual leaves school, they do not return.9
Starting at age 16, individuals receive wage oﬀers in every period that depend on their
years of education completed so far, on the type and number of years of primary and sec-
ondary school attended, on the number of years attended before and after the voucher pro-
gram was introduced, and on labor market experience, which accumulates endogeneously.
Individuals can choose to accept the wage oﬀer or be unemployed, in which case they receive
a minimal unemployment consumption benefit. The model does not incorporate a savings
decision, both for reasons of simplification and because few individuals in our sample report
substantial voluntary savings.10
To allow for the possibility of unobservables aﬀecting selection into types of schools and
wages, we incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in the form of discrete unobserved types
(e.g., Heckman and Singer, 1984). Let µk be an indicator variable that equals 1 if the in-
dividual is of type k, where k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.The probability of being a particular type depends
on family background variables that include parents’ education, family socioeconomic back-
ground when the individual was growing up (as reported in our survey), and the number of
siblings. These variables are initial conditions in the model. The state space of the model
consists of schooling history (type of primary education, type of secondary education, num-
ber of years of primary education pre/post voucher program, number of years of secondary
9In the Ben-Porath (1967) model, where individuals choose when to invest in schooling, it is optimal to
take schooling at the beginning of the lifetime to maximize the time period over which to reap the returns
from schooling. We impose the simplifying assumption that individuals cannot return to school once they left
in part because the data record the total years of education completed and not the precise school attendance
history.
10Chile has a privatized pension system that requires individuals to save 10% in their pension account,
which constitutes the primary form of savings for most people.
11
education pre/post voucher program, number of years of college education and accumulated
labor market experience.
During the ages (a) when the individual has the option of attending primary school,
the current period alternative specific utility functions (U iak) associated with the diﬀerent
schooling types for a persion of type k are:
USak = Σ
K
k=1µkb
S
1k − T S1 1 (va = 0) + δS1 1 (R1 = 1) + εSa (1)
UNSak =
K
k=1µkb
NS
1k − TNS1 + δNS1 1 (R1 = 1) + εNSa (2)
UMak =
K
k=1µkb
M
1k + δ
M
1 1 (R1 = 1) + ε
M
a (3)
bi1k (i = S,NS,M,C) is a psychic cost (consumption value) of attending diﬀerent types of
primary school (or of attending college after secondary school) that may vary according to
unobserved type, TS1 and T
NS
1 are costs at subsidized and unsubsidized schools and at college
respectively (the cost is zero at a municipal school). va is an indicator variable that equals 1
if the family is eligible for voucher at the child’s age a, in which case the family does not pay
the tuition cost at a subsidized private school. R1 is an indicator for whether the individual
lives in the capital city, Santiago, which is home to about half of Chile’s population. This
is included to reflect the fact that there is greater availability of private schools in Santiago
along with good public transportation options. There is a vector of preference shocks
(εSa , ε
NS
a , ε
M
a ) associated with diﬀerent types of primary schooling. Let d
S
1 = 1 if attended
private subsidized primary, and dNS1 = 1 if attended private nonsubsidized primary (else the
indicator variable equal 0). Similarly, let dS2 = 1 if attended private subsidized secondary,
and dNS2 = 1 if attended private nonsubsidized secondary school.
The utility associated with the diﬀerent secondary school choices depends on preference
parameters, tuition costs (TS2 , T
NS
2 ), costs of switching types of schools (ρ
prim,sec, prim ∈
{M,S,NS}, sec ∈ {M,S,NS}), and on region of residence (R1). In the equations below,
1() denotes a function that equals one if the expression in parentheses is true.
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USak = Σ
K
k=1µkb
S
2k − TS2 1 (va = 0) + ρM,S(1− dS1 )(1− dNS1 )1(Ea = 9) + ρS,SdS1 1(Ea = 9) +(4)
ρNS,SdNS1 1(Ea = 9) + δ
S
2R1 + ε
S
a (5)
UNSak = [Σ
K
k=1µkb
NS
2k − TNS2 ] + ρM,NS(1− dS1 )(1− dNS1 )1(Ea = 9) + ρS,NSdS1 1(Ea = 9) + (6)
ρNS,NSdNS1 1(Ea = 9) + δ
NS
2 R1 + ε
NS
a (7)
UMak = Σ
K
k=1µkb
M
2k + ρ
M,M(1− dS1 )(1− dNS1 )1(Ea = 9) + ρS,MdS1 1(Ea = 9) + (8)
ρNS,MdNS1 1(Ea = 9) + δ
M
2 R1 + ε
M
a , (9)
with a corresponding vector of preference shocks.
After the individual completes at least two years of school, there is the option to drop out
and stay home (leisure). After age 16, there is the option to work. To better capture the
pattern of some periods of unemployment prior to the first job, the model also incorporates
a job search cost that is only incurred only with the first job (when experience xa equals 0),
and that depends on the level of educational attainment, Ea ( <8 years, 8-11 years and 12
or more years). Denote the job search costs for the diﬀerent education levels by ψEa . The
utility from working is the wage minus any job search cost:
UWak = wak − 1(xa = 0)ψEa
The utility from leisure depends on preference parameters and a leisure preference shock:
ULak = Σ
K
k=1µkb
L
k + ε
L
a .
An individual who finishes high school can work, stay home or attend college. If he attends
college, during those periods, he gets the utility:
UCak = Σ
K
k=1µkb
C
k − TC + δC1 (R1 = 1) + εCa ,
where TC is the college tuition cost and δC is a transportation cost that may diﬀer in the
Santiago region. After completing school, individuals choose between staying at home or
working.
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In the model, individuals may attend private instead of public schools because they get
higher utility and/or because private schooling generates higher future wage returns. Let
EPa denote the number of years of primary school attended and E
S
a the number of years
of secondary education. Some individuals in the sample completed their schooling before
the voucher program was introduced, while others had the option of using the vouchers
over part or all of their schooling careers. To allow for changes in the returns to all types
of education after the voucher program was introduced, we distinguish years of education
pre and post voucher. Let EP,v=0a and E
S,v=0
a denote the number of years of primary and
secondary education attended prior to the voucher program, and EP,v=1a and E
S,v=1
a the
number of years attended after introduction of vouchers. Total years equals:
EPa = E
P,v=0
a +E
P,v=1
a
ESa = E
S,v=0
a +E
S,v=1
a
Ga denotes the number of years of college education completed as of age a.
We assume that the amount of human capital embodied in a person depends on the
educational attainment, the type of primary and seconday schools attended, how much
schooling was obtained before or after the introduction of vouchers, and the amount of labor
market experience, x:
Hak = ϕ(EP,v=0a , E
P,v=1
a , E
S,v=0
a , E
S,v=1
a , Ga, xa, d
S
1 , d
NS
1 , d
S
2 , d
NS
2 , µk).
The wage oﬀer equation is the product of the price paid per unit of human capital and the
amount of human capital possessed by the person. We also introduce a stochastic term εWa to
reflect additional sources of heterogeneity in the amount of human capital and measurement
error. The prices are allowed to vary depending on the regional labor market (here, whether
the individual lives in the capital city).
wa = pHHaε˜Wa
Taking logs and assuming that the log human capital production equation is linear in years
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of schooling and quadratic in work experience, we obtain the log wage equation:
lnwa = α+ ΣKk=1µkβ0k + (10)
β1E
P
a + γ1E
P,v=1
a + (11)
βS1E
P
a d
S
1 + γ
S
1E
P,v=1
a d
S
1 + (12)
βNS1 E
P
a d
NS
1 + γ
NS
1 E
P,v=1
a d
NS
1 + (13)
β2E
S
a + γ2E
S,v=1
a + (14)
βS2E
S
a d
S
2a + γ
S
2E
S,v=1
a d
S
2a + (15)
βNS2 E
S
a d
NS
2a + γ
NS
2 E
S,v=1
a d
NS
2a + (16)
βM,S3 Ga + β
NS
3 Ga + β4xa + β5x
2
a + ε
W
a . (17)
The intercept of the log wage equation, β0k, which is allowed to depend on unobserved
type to capture unobservable heterogeneity in human capital. The coeﬃcients β refer to the
returns to diﬀerent types of education prior to the introduction of the voucher program. The
specification is more general than a standard Mincer-type specification, because it allows
returns to primary, secondary and college years of schooling to diﬀer. The γ coeﬃcients
represent the diﬀerence in the return after the introduction of the voucher (i.e. the return
to schooling post voucher is given by β + γ). The γ coeﬃcients are introduced to allow
for the possibility that the voucher program potentially changed the quality of all types of
schools. For example, increased competition may have improved the quality of both public
and private schools. On the other hand, the voucher program could have drawn some of the
better teachers out of the public school system, lowering public school quality. Thus, the
coeﬃcient γ could be either positive or negative. Below, we present evidence that individuals
educated in the post-voucher period receive higher returns to their schooling.
Individuals diﬀer in terms of the timing of the voucher program with respect to their
schooling career. For example, an individual may have attended 5 years of primary school
pre-voucher and 3 years primary and all of secondary post-voucher. βNS1 and β
S
1 (γ
NS
1 and
γS1 ) capture the premium that individuals receive in the labor market for attending a private
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primary school, which is allowed to diﬀer by type of school (non-subsidized verses subsidized).
The coeﬃcients βNS2 and β
S
2 (γ
NS
1 and γ
S
1 ) capture the premium for having attended either
a subsidized or non-subsidized private secondary school. If an individual attends secondary
school, then there are nine diﬀerent schooling type choices possible: public primary and
secondary, public primary and private subsidized secondary, public primary and nonsubsi-
dized private secondary, subsidized private primary and public secondary, subsidized private
primary and private subsidized secondary, subsidized private primary and private nonsubsi-
dized secondary, nonsubsidizied private primary and public seconday, nonsubsidizied private
primary and subsidized secondary, subsidized secondary and nonsubsidizied secondary. The
coeﬃcients βM,S3 and β
NS
3 is the earnings return for each year of college attended, which is
allowed to diﬀer depending on whether an individual attended a nonsubsidized private sec-
ondary school.11 β4 and β5 represent the market return to actual labor market experience.
The maximized present discounted value of lifetime utility at t, the value function, is
given by
V (Ω(a), a) = max
dj(a)∈K(a)
E{
AX
τ=a
βτ−tU ja |Ω(a)},
where U ja is the maximum of the alternatives available to the individual at age t, denoted
K(a). A is the terminal age of the model, assumed to be age 62 (the standard retirement
age in Chile for men). The expectation is taken over the distribution of preference and wage
shocks.
4 Model Solution and Estimation
The solution to the optimization problem is a set of decision rules that relate the optimal
choice at any age a, from among the feasible set of alternatives, to elements of the state
space. Recasting the problem in a dynamic programming framework, the value function can
be written as the maximum over alternative-specific value functions, V j(Ω(a), a), i.e., the
11Individuals who attended nonsubsidized private secondary schools are more likely to be admitted to the
most elite universities in Chile, which are University of Chile and Catholica University.
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expected discounted value of alternative j ∈ K(a) that satisfies the Bellman equation
V (Ω(a), a) = max
j∈K(a)
[V j(Ω(a), a)]
V j(Ω(a), a) = U j(a,Ω(a)) + βE(V (Ω(a+ 1), a+ 1|dj(a) = 1,Ω(a)) for a < A,
= U j(A,Ω(A)) for a = A.
The solution of the optimization problem is not analytic, so the model is solved numeri-
cally. The solution consists of values of E(V (Ωt+1, t+1|dj(a),Ω(a)) for all j and elements of
Ω(a). We refer to this function as the Emax. The solution method is by backwards recursion,
beginning with the last period, A. The multivariate integrations necessary to calculate the
expected value of the maximum of the alternative-specific value functions at each state point
are performed by Monte Carlo integration over the shocks. The state space is manageable,
so that we evaluate the value of the Emax function at every possible state point without
having to use interpolation methods.
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. Let Oit represent the outcomes (edu-
cation choices, work choices, observed wages) of individual i and age a. Also, let Ii denote
the set of initial conditions for that individual (family background variables, type of primary
school attended). The contribution to the likelihood of individual i is given by:
Li =
KX
k=1
Pr(Oia, Oia−1, ..., Oia0;µk = 1, Ii) Pr(µk = 1|Ii)
where Pr(µk = 1|Ii) denotes the type probability which depends on initial conditions, which
in our application represent family background socioeconomic status, parental education
levels and numbers of siblings. The unobserved type is assumed to be known to the individual
but not to the econometrician; the outside summation integrates over the type probabilities.
The likelihood can be written as the product over the age-specific choice probabilities:
Li =
KX
k=1
ΠAa=a0 Pr(Oia|Oia−1, ..., Oia0 ;µk = 1, Ii) Pr(µk = 1|Ii).
To illustate the calculation of the likelihood, suppose that the jth alternative chosen by
individual i is to work, so that we observe a wage at age a. The probability of observing
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that choice and wage outcome conditional on the state space (which includes Oia−1, ..., Oia0 ,
I and type) is:
Pr(dj(a) = 1, wa|Ω(a), I, µk = 1) = Pr(dj(a)|wa,Ω(a), I)f(wa|Ω(a), I, µk = 1),
where f(wa|Ω(a), I, µk = 1) is the wage density.
The overall likelihood for i = 1..N individuals is the product over the individual likeli-
hoods:
L = ΠNi=1Li.
To complete the description of the model, we need to specify the functional form for the
type probabilities. They are assumed that type depends on parents’ education, number of
siblings, and family socioeconomic status (the initial conditions, denoted Ii) in the following
way.
P (type = k|Ii) = exp(I
0
iτ)
1 + exp(I 0iτ)
To estimate the probilities, Pr(Oit|Oit−1, ..., Oit0;µk = 1) in a way that improves the
empirical performance of the estimator, we use the kernel smoothed frequency simulator
proposed by McFadden (1989). For each set of error term draws, the kernel of the integral
is
exp{V i(a)−max(V j(a))τ }
ΠJl=1 exp{V
l(a)−max(V j(a))
τ }
,
times the density of the observed wages. Here, V i(a) is the value function associated with
the choice that person i made at age a, max(V j(a)) is the value function associated with the
maximal choice, and τ is a smoothing parameter.
The model parameters enter the likelihood through the choice probabilities that are
computed from the solution of the dynamic programming problem. Subsets of parameters
also enter through the wage oﬀer function. The maximization of the likelihood function
iterates between solving the dynamic program and calculating the likelihood.
18
5 Empirical Results
6 Data
In 2002, the Microdata Center of the Department of Economics of the Universidad de Chile,
conducted a new household survey called Historia Laboral y Seguridad Social (HLLS); in
2004, it administered a follow-up survey, the Enquesta Proteccion Sociale (EPS). The data
from the 2002 survey contain demographic and labor market information on 17,246 individ-
uals age 15 or older, including information on household characteristics, education, training
and work history, pension plan participation, savings, as well as more limited information on
health, assets, disability status and utilization of medical services. Of particular relevance to
this project are the questions on labor force and participation in training/education, which
include retrospective information back to 1981, questions on educational attainment, fam-
ily background (number of siblings, parent’s education, poverty status during adolescence),
type of primary and secondary school attended, and location (geographic region) of schools
attended. Appendix A contains a detailed description of the sampling frame for the 2002
and 2004 surveys.
Our analysis sample consists of 4517 male individuals for whom we observe the educa-
tional attainment and labor force participation dating back up to 35 years (the year 1970)
until 2004. We have a total of 94411 person-year observations on these individuals. Each
individual was asked the type of primary and secondary school they attended. We assume
that they started attending school at age 6 (the standard age) and attended continuously
until the end of their schooling career.12
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the means of variables used in our analysis, for the complete sample and by type
of primary school attended. The average age is 30.6 years and the average education level 11.0
12The assumption of continuous schooling was made in part because we do not have information on the
exact schooling progression pattern, only on the final attainment.
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years. A comparison of the last three columns shows that individuals who attended municipal
primary attain on average 10.5 years of schooling. Those who attend private primary schools
complete substantially more education, with an average of 12.8 years for those attending
private subsidized primary and 14.1 years for those attending private nonsubsidized primary.
Roughly a third of our sample resided in Santiago (the capital city) at the time of attending
school. School attendance patterns are diﬀerent in Santiago, in part because of the wider
availability of all types of schools as well as good public transportation options. More than
half of people who report attending private primary schools (subsidized or nonsubsidized) did
so in Santiago. The annual earnings of our sample is $3835, in 2002 US Dollar-equivalents.
Average earnings are roughly comparable for those attending municipal or subsidized primary
school, but are nearly double for those attending nonsubsidized private school ($6691 on
average).
Table 1 also provides information on the family background of the individuals in our
sample. The men in our sample attain much higher average education levels than did their
parents; on average, the mothers’ have 7.1 years of education and the fathers’ 7.8 years. The
parental education levels are higher by 0.3-0.5 years for individuals who attended private
subsidized primary school than for municipal school attendees, and almost two years higher
for private unsubsidized primary school attendees. Respondents were also asked about
the poverty status of their family while growing up, which was reported in four categories:
indigent, poor, good and very good. Only a small proportion (2.5%) report their family
background as indigent. The majority report their family’s socioeconomic status as being
poor (34.8%) or good (59.2%), and a small proportion (3.4%) report very good. As seen in
the table, individuals who attend private schools are less likely to report their background
as indigent or poor. On average, the individuals in our sample have 3.7 siblings, with a
slightly fewer (3.3 on average) for private school attendees. In the model we estimate, family
background and numbers of siblings are determinants of the type probability.
As seen in Figure 1, following the introduction of vouchers in 1980, the percentage of
individuals attending municipal schools decreased dramatically. The decrease was most pro-
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nounced in the first five years, but continued thereafter. Correspondingly, the percentage of
individuals attending private subsidized primary schools increased. The percentage attend-
ing private nonsubsidized schools exhibits an increase over the 1990-2000 period followed
by a slight decline. The percentage choosing private nonsubsidized schools is overall much
smaller, ranging from a low of 5.1 in 1981 to a high of 9.5 in 1996.
Tables 2a and 2b examine how the choice of primary school type relates to the choice
of secondary school type, for subsamples who were (Table 2a) and were not (Table 2b)
exposed to school vouchers prior to age 15 (when individuals typically start secondary school).
Each cell shows both unconditional and conditional (on primary school type) probabilities
of choosing certain secondary schooling types. Among those not exposed to vouchers by
age 15, 34.9% of those who attended municipal primary school did not attend secondary
school. Among those exposed, the percentage not attending secondary goes down to 19.7%.
Those who attend a municipal primary school and continue on in secondary are most likely
to transition to a subsidized secondary school. Conditional on having attended a private
primary school (either subsidized or nonsubsidized), the probability of attending a private
nonsubsidized secondary school remains the same regardless of whether exposed to vouchers.
However, the probability of attending a municipal school declines and the probability of
attending a private subsidized school increases. In summary, the sample exposed to vouchers
is much more likely to continue on to secondary school and more likely to attend private
subsidized primary and secondary schools.
Figure 2 examines how school attendance patterns diﬀer by types of schools attended.
In particular, it shows the percentage of individuals still in school at a given age, by type of
primary and secondary schools attended. The top panel shows the school-going patterns for
individuals that attended municipal primary school, by type of secondary attended. The
notation "M,." refers to municipal primary and no secondary; "MM" to municipal primary,
municipal secondary; "M,S" to municipal primary, subsidized private secondary"; "M,N"
to municipal primary, nonsubsidized secondary. Regardless of primary school attended,
individuals who attend nonsubsidized secondary schools show the highest attendance rates by
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age and are also most likly to attend college. Individuals who attend nonsubsidized primary
and secondary schools have the highest attendance rates during college-age years, with about
two-thirds still in school at age 20. Among those who do not attend secondary schools,
individuals enrolled in subsidized primary school have higher primary school attendance
rates.
Figure 3 shows the educational attainment distribution, overall and by type of primary
school attended. Individuals who attended municipal schools are much more likely to be
in the lowest education categories or to have dropped out of primary school. Only 31%
complete 12th grade and only 17% go beyond. Individuals who attend private subsidized
primary schools are more likely to finish 12th grade (35%) or go beyond (44%), but their
educational attainment is not nearly as high as that of individuals attending nonsubdizied
primary schools, 67% of whom go to some college.
Figure 4 graphs the percentage working by age and by type of primary school attended,
where the sample is restricted to individuals who have completed their schooling and are
legally permitted to work (age 15 and older). The diﬀerences in working rates are most
pronounced in the 20’s, when those who attended municipal schools exhibit the highest
rates of working. For example, at age 24, 86% of municipal school attendees are working
in comparison to 74% of private subsidized primary attendees and only 58% of private
nonsubsidized. Starting at around the mid 30’s, though, the working rates of individuals
who attend nonsubsidized private schools surpass those of the other groups and reach close
to 100%, while those who attended either municipal or private subsidized primary schools
have lower rates of around 93%. There is a decline in working rates in the late 40’s among
those who attended municipal or subsidized private primary schools.
Figure 5 graphs the age-earnings relationship by educational attainment categories and
type of primary school attended. The age-earnings curves are smoothed using local regres-
sion.13 Among those completing less than 8 years of education, municipal school attendees
have a flatter age-earnings relationship than private school attendees. For individuals com-
13A bandwidth of 5 years was used for the plots.
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pleting 8 to 11 years of school or who complete high school only (12 years), the age-earnings
relationship is comparable across the three diﬀerent schooling types, with no clear evidence of
an earnings premium for having attended a private primary school. For those who complete
more than 12 years of schooling, earnings are comparable for those who attended municipal
or subsidized private schools but are much higher for those who attended pnonsubsidized pri-
vate schools. This diﬀerence is most likely attributable to diﬀerences in the types of colleges
attended, with a higher proportion of private nonsubsidized secondary schools attending the
premiere universities (Catholica University and Universidad de Chile).
6.1.1 Reduced form estimated decision rule models
In Tables 3, 4 and 5, we present estimates of choice models that relate the decision variables
in our model (school attendance, type of school attended, educational attainment and work)
to the state variables. These estimates are reduced form in that they do not impose the
structure of the model and also do not account for unobservable heterogeneity; they are,
however, useful for exploring correlations in the data. Table 3 shows the estimation results
where the outcome measure is educational attainment. In the first column, the specification
includes two indicator variables for whether the voucher program was available during pri-
mary and secondary school ages (ages 6-14 and ages 15-18). The second column of estimates
includes a variable that indicates the total number of years the individual was exposed to the
voucher program at any point over ages 6-18. For example, if the individual was in second
grade when the program was introduced, the exposure is 10 years. Under both specifica-
tions, individuals who attended school during a period when vouchers were available, ceteris
paribus, have substantially higher years of education. The first specification shows that
exposure starting in primary school, prior to making secondary school type choices, is most
important. Conditional on primary exposure, exposure to vouchers during secondary school
is not associated with significantly higher years of education. Individuals whose parents
(mothers and/or fathers) have more education also achieve higher educational attainment
levels, with the estimated coeﬃcient on mother’s education being twice as large as that on
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father’s education. Also, individuals from less poor families have higher educational attain-
ment levels (the omitted category is "indigent"). The number of siblings is not a significant
predictor of educational attainment, conditional on the other included variables. Residing
in the city of Santiago at the time of attending school is associated with 1.33 years higher
attainment.
Table 4 presents estimates from a multinomial logit model for the choice of primary school
type, where the estimates refer to the probability of choosing a subsidized or nonsubsidized
private primary school relative to a municipal school. Having the voucher available during
primary school years is associated with a statistically significant increase in the probability
of choosing the subsidized primary private school type (the only private school type that
accepts the voucher), without any significant change in the probability of choosing the non-
subsidized primary school type. The coeﬃcient associated with voucher exposure during
secondary school years is not statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero. Mothers’ and
father’s education are statistically significant determinants of the probability of choosing a
private unsubsidized school. Individuals with more siblings are less likely to attend private
schools. The family background variables are not significant determinants of the choice of
primary school type, conditional on the other included regressors. Residing in Santiago
makes it much more likely that an individual attends private primary school.
Table 5 presents estimates from a probit model of the probability of working, where
the subsample includes all person-year observations for those 15 or older who are not in
school. More years of education increases the probability of working in a given year. Being
exposed to the voucher program during primary school years decreases the probability of
working, and being exposed only in secondary school years has no significant eﬀect. Having
a father with more years of education and having more siblings are both associated with
increased probabilities of working (statistically significant at 5% level). Not surprisingly,
more previous labor market experience increases the probability of working in the current
period. The probability of working also increases with age at a decreasing rate. Lastly,
residing in Santiago substantially increases the probability of working.
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6.2 Empirical Results
6.3 Parameter Estimates and Model fit
Table 6a and 6b report the fit of the estimated model to the actual schooling choice distribu-
tions for the subsamples who were and were not exposed to vouchers by age 15. To generate
these fits, we use the estimated model to simulate choices for all the individuals in our sam-
ple, starting from their initial conditions, and we compare simulated and actual choices. In
the tables, the simulated cell percentage appears in parentheses under the actual percentage.
The model predicts a large diﬀerence in the schooling choice distribution for the two groups
that diﬀer in their voucher exposure, as is present in the data. The model underpredicts
somewhat the percentage of individuals attending municipal primary school who do not go
on to secondary school for the subgroup not exposed to vouchers (prior to age 15). The
model is fairly accurate in predicting the distribution of school choices for those who attend
private subsidized primary school. The predictions are less accurate for attending private
unsubsidized primary school who were exposed to vouchers, but these individuals constitute
only about 5% of the individuals exposed. Aggregating across all secondary school types,
the model predicts fairly well the proportions attending diﬀerent kinds of primary schools,
for both subsamples (the last column of the tables).
Table 7 presents the goodness-of-fit for the educational attainment distribution. The
model fits reasonably well the distribution for the subsample exposed to vouchers, except
that too many people are simulated to drop out of highly at grade 11 rather than at complete
grade 12 (the final year of highschool). For the subsample not exposed to vouchers, too many
people are predicted to continue schooling after primary school and to complete 9, 10 and
11 years of education. However, the prediction of the percentage completing 12 or more
(about 43%) is accurate. The simulation generates a substantial diﬀerence in education
attainment between the sample exposed and not exposed to vouchers, as is observed in the
data, although the predicted diﬀerences understate somewhat the actual diﬀerences. When
the two samples (those exposed and not exposed to vouchers during primary school) are
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combined, in the last two columns, the fit of the model to the education distribution is good.
Table 8 reports evidence on how the model fits the labor force participation patterns,
disaggregated by type of primary and secondary schools attended. The numbers in paren-
theses indicate the number of person-year observations in that cell. The model captures
the general pattern of rising labor force participation rates with age (over the age ranges
indicated), although the age increase is a little steeper in the data than in the simulation.
The predicted patterns also capture the fact that individuals who attend private schools have
lower participation rates over younger ages (age 16-25). There are some categories, such as
individuals who attend municipal primary only, for which the predicted participation is low
relative to the data.
Table 9 shows the model fit to wages. The mean overall annual wages predicted by
the model is $4712, which is close to the actual mean of $4815. Disaggregating by school
types, we see that the simulated model reproduces the pattern of lower wages for municipal
school attendees and higher wages for private school attendees, as observed in the data. It
also generates the pattern of higher wages for those who attended nonsubsidized primary
and secondary schools, although the simulated wages in this category understate the actual
wages. The simulation also yields that wages are lowest for those who do not attend
secondary school, particularly for those who attended only municipal primary, who earn
about three quarters of the overall average wage.
6.4 Counterfactual policy evaluation
We next use the estimated model to explore how the school tuition vouchers aﬀect school at-
tendance and labor market decisions and whether vouchers contributed to declining inequal-
ity in educational attainment and earnings outcomes. To perform this policy simulation, we
use the model to simulate choices and outcomes with and without the voucher program in
place. The simulation without the program modifies the budget constraint to reflect the ad-
ditional tuition cost that would have to be paid for private schooling and adjusts the return
to years of schooling for all school types to correspond to pre-voucher levels. The eﬀects of
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the voucher program on the returns to schooling are identified from diﬀerences in the wages
paid to those who received education in the pre and post voucher periods, controlling for
actual labor market experience.14
One potential concern in performing these simulations is that there may have been other
improvements in the quality of schools in the post-voucher period that also influence the
wage returns to schooling. Table 10 summarizes the major schooling reforms that took
place in Chile since 1980. As seen in the table, a number of reforms were instituted in 1990,
most notably an expansion in the value of the voucher, an increase in school resources (in
part implemented through the increase in the value of the voucher), and an almost doubling
of the public school teacher wage that was negotiated by the teacher’s union. The change
in the teacher’s wage is unlikely to dramatically aﬀect the quality of the schooling over the
short term, because it takes some time to become a licensed teacher and to replace existing
teachers. Over the longer-term, however, the higher wage would be expected to attract
more qualified entrants into the teaching profession and improve school quality.15 Some
additional schooling reforms were instituted in later years, including a competitive school
funding program called SNED (implemented in 1996), an increase in the length of the school
day along with a school expansion program (implemented in year 2000), and the introduction
of a new teacher evaluation and certification program in 2002 and 2003.
Most of these reforms come after the individuals in our sample have already completed
their schooling. In fact, only 5% of our sample was potentially exposed to the 1996 reform
while in primary school, and none were exposed to the year 2000 or subsequent reforms.
Roughly 15% of our sample was attending primary and secondary school in 1990, so these
individuals might have been aﬀected by the 1990 schooling reform that expanded the value
of the voucher and increased the teacher wage. For reasons of parsimony, our model specifi-
cation does not allow for changes in the return to education for individuals attending in the
14Recall that the wage data pertain to years 2002 and 2004, so the wage data are measured at the same
time for everyone.
15There is a college entrance exam given in Chile analogous to the SAT in the US. These reforms corre-
sponded with a reversal in a long-term declining trend in the average test scores of new teachers, suggesting
that the higher pay did increase the quality of new entrants into the teaching profession.
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post 1990 time period for part of their schooling career, although such an extension would
potentially be feasible.
6.4.1 Eﬀects of voucher program on educational outcomes
Table 10 reports the eﬀect of vouchers on educational outcomes for the subsample that was
exposed to vouchers at any point during their primary education years. To explore distri-
butional eﬀects of the program, results are reported for the whole sample and by whether
the individual reports being from a poor family or not, where poor family corresponds to
having reported either being indigent or poor when growing up.16 As seen in the first row
of table 10, the voucher program increases attendance at private subsidized primary schools
by 4.7%. The increase in subsidized private primary school attendance is a little larger for
the non-poor subsample (5.0%) than for the poor subsample (4.2%). There is similarly a
substantial increase in attendance at subsidized secondary private schools, which is again
greater for the non-poor subsample (6.4%) than for the poor sample (5.8%). The voucher
program reduces the attendance rate at nonsubsidized primary private schools by around
-0.7% and at nonsubsidized secondary private schools (-0.1%), suggesting that some of the
students attending the nonsubsidized private schools are induced by the voucher tuition
incentive to attend the subsidized school.
We would expect the greater incentives for education operating through vouchers to
stimulate college-going as well, because completing highschool is a prerequisite for attending
college. The simulation indicates a 5% increase in college attendance, which is again slightly
greater for the nonpoor (5.3%) than the poor subsamples (4.2%). The simulation indicates
that the 25th percentile, the median, and the 75th percentile educational attainment levels
increase by one year in the non-poor sample, with no increase for the median years for the
poor sample.
Table 11 shows how the voucher program aﬀects the entire education distribution for the
same three subsamples. The impacts are most substantial around the grade 9-12 range; the
16Family background socioeconomic status was reported in four categories and we take the first two
categories as poor.
28
percentage of individuals completing those grades increases in the range of 5.7-7.8 percentage
points. Smaller impacts are observed for earlier and later grades. The simulation shows that
the percentage of students graduating from college (which lasts 3-5 years for most degree
programs) is also increased.
Overall, the results in this table suggest that the voucher program simulated schoolgoing
and lead to higher educational attainment levels overall. We observe a higher highschool
graduation rate (by 7.4%), a higher rate of college attendance (by 4.9%) and a higher rate
of college completion. Both children from poor and nonpoor families experience positive
impacts of the program, but the children from non-poor families experience a somewhat
greater benefit.
6.4.2 Eﬀect of voucher program on labor market outcomes
In Table 12, we simulate the eﬀect of the voucher program on earnings and labor force
participation. The increase in educational attainment alone would be expected to increase
wage oﬀers, which in turn would tend to increase labor force participation. An additional
source of increase in wage oﬀers comes from the fact that post-voucher education returns
are estimated to be higher than pre-voucher education returns. As seen in Table 13, mean
earnings are higher with the voucher program by more than $300 for both the poor and
nonpoor subsamples, over age ranges 16-45. This represents about a 7% increase in earnings,
measured against the benchmark mean earnings of 3847 (see Table 1). The eﬀect of the
program on mean earnings is comparable in the poor and non-poor subsamples.
As expected, the higher wage oﬀers leads to an increase in the labor force participation
rate, with the largest impact on labor force participation rates of about three percentage
points occuring over the age 26-35 range. The increase in participation is lower at younger
ages, because the stimulus from higher wage oﬀers is mitigated by longer time spent in
school, which delays their labor force entry.
In future research, we also plan to evaluate the eﬀects of alternative programs to uni-
versal vouchers, that include (i) targeting the vouchers selectively at poor households, (ii)
29
providing school attendance subsidies instead of vouchers, and (iii) implementing high school
graduation and college attendance bonuses.
7 Conclusions
This paper develops and estimates a dynamic model of schooling and labor supply and uses
it to study the longer term eﬀects of school vouchers in Chile on educational and labor force
outcomes over the life-cycle. The previous literature on vouchers in the Chilean context has
focused on test score impacts using test score data collected many years after the voucher
reform was introduced. Our study focuses on a longer time horizon using information on
individuals who obtained their education before or during the reform period and therefore
has the potential to capture reform related changes in both public and private sector schools.
We find that returns to education are lowest in the municipal schools and highest in the
private subsidized schools, both at the primary and secondary levels. However, the gap in
the returns between public and private sector education decreased after the introduction of
vouchers. When we simulate schooling and labor force behavior with and without vouchers,
we find substantial eﬀects on educational attainment, high school graduation rates, college
attendance, college graduation rates, wages, and labor supply. The largest impacts on labor
supply are not observed until after age 25, because the program at first delays labor force en-
try as individuals complete more schooling. Positive impacts on educational attainment are
observed over the entire education distribution, with the most substantial impacts observed
around grades 9-12. The percentage of individuals completing those grades increases in the
range of 5.7-7.8 percentage points. We also observe a substantial eﬀect of the program on
earnings outcomes. Average wages of workers increase, on average by about $300 per year,
which represents about a 7% increase.
In considering the distributional consequences of the voucher program, we find that in-
dividuals from both poor and nonpoor families benefit from the program. However, the
education and wage benefits appear to be somewhat greater for individuals from nonpoor
families.
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Appendix A
The sampling frame of the 2002 HLSS survey consists of individuals enrolled in the social
security system for at least one month during the 1981-2001 time period, which included
individuals who in 2002 were working, unemployed, out of the labor force, receiving pen-
sions, or deceased (in which case the information was collected from surviving relatives). The
sample was drawn from a sampling frame of approximately 8.1 million current and former
aﬃliates compiled from oﬃcial databases (which covers approximately 75% of the popula-
tion). The sampling frame for the EPS in 2004 was augmented to include individuals not
aﬃliated with the social security system, so that the sample is representative of the entire
Chilean population over the age of 15. Individuals who were interviewed in 2004 but were
not interviewed in 2002 were asked questions pertaining both to the 2002 and 2004 time
period. In our analysis, we use the longitudinal data collected by both the 2002 and 2004
surveys.
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
(Std. Deviation in Parentheses) 
  Overall  Municipal 
Primary 
Private 
subsidized 
primary 
Private 
unsubsidized 
primary 
Age  32.4 
(8.2) 
33.2 
(8.0) 
28.3 
(8.1) 
31.2 
(8.8) 
Years of education  10.8 
(3.4) 
10.3 
(3.3) 
12.7 
(2.7) 
14.1 
(2.8) 
Attended primary in Santiago  34.6 
(0.48) 
30.0 
(45.8) 
56.3 
(49.6) 
54.8 
(50.0) 
Attended secondary in Santiago  30.0 
(45.8) 
24.7 
(43.2) 
52.9 
(50.0) 
55.3 
(50.0) 
Annual earnings (in 2002 dollars)  3847 
(4660) 
3776 
(4081) 
3765 
(4149) 
7485 
(10556) 
Mother’s education  7.0 
(3.61) 
7.0 
(3.6) 
7.3 
(4.1) 
8.8 
(4.8) 
Father’s education  7.7 
(3.9) 
7.7 
(3.9) 
8.2 
(4.3) 
9.7 
(5.1) 
Family  
     Indigent 
 
2.6 
(16.0) 
 
2.6 
(16.0) 
 
2.7 
(0.16) 
 
2.3 
(15.0) 
     Poor  35.7 
(47.9) 
36.6 
(48.2) 
30.7 
(46.2) 
33.6 
(47.4) 
     Good  58.3 
(49.3) 
57.6 
(49.4) 
62.6 
(48.4) 
59.0 
(49.3) 
     Very good  3.3 
(17.9) 
3.1 
(17.3) 
4.0 
(19.7) 
5.1 
(22.0) 
Number of siblings  3.8 
(2.7) 
3.9 
(2.7) 
3.3 
(2.6) 
3.4 
(2.9) 
 
Number of observations 
 
4515 
 
3705 
 
593 
 
217 
         
 
Table 2a 
Choice of Primary and Secondary School Types 
Sample not exposed to vouchers before age 15 (1818 individuals) 
(conditional probabilities in parentheses) 
    Secondary School Type   
    None  Municipal  Subsidized  Nonsubsidized  All Secondary 
types 
Primary Type  Municipal  36.07 
(40.9) 
46.9 
(53.2) 
4.46  
(5.1) 
0.77  
(0.9) 
88.2 
 
    Subsidized  1.21  
(16.3) 
2.53  
(34.1) 
3.52  
(47.4) 
0.17 
(2.2) 
7.5 
 
  Nonsubsidized  0.22  
(5.1) 
 
1.65 
(38.0) 
 
0.50 
(11.4) 
 
1.98 
(45.6) 
 
4.3 
 
    37.50     51.10       8.48       2.92   
 
Table 2b 
Choice of Primary and Secondary School Types 
Subsample exposed to vouchers before age 15 (2830 individuals) 
(conditional probabilities in parentheses) 
     Secondary School Type   
    None  Municipal Subsidized Nonsubsidized  All secondary 
types 
Primary Type  Municipal  19.71 
(25.3) 
45.94 
(64.0) 
10.78 
(9.2) 
1.48 
 (1.5) 
77.9 
 
  Subsidized  1.04 
(9.8) 
5.19 
(32.0) 
9.78 
(52.9) 
0.96 
(5.9) 
17.0 
 
  Nonsubsidized  0.15 
 (9.5) 
0.93 
(28.5) 
0.89 
(9.5) 
3.15 
(48.0) 
5.1 
 
     
20.9 
 
 
52.06 
 
21.49 
 
5.59 
 
             
 
 Table 3  
Decision Rule Model for Years of Education 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable†  (1) 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(2) 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Intercept  7.61 
(0.35) 
7.24 
(0.43) 
Voucher available during    
    primary school years 
1.34 
(0.11) 
… 
Voucher available during  
   secondary school years 
0.16 
(0.17) 
… 
Years exposed to voucher†† 
 
…  0.13 
(0.02) 
Mother’s education  0.07 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.03) 
Father’s education  0.04 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Number of Siblings  ‐0.03 
(0.02) 
‐0.01 
(0.02) 
Family background poor  0.83 
(0.31) 
1.02 
(0.39) 
Family background good  1.31 
(0.31) 
1.39 
(0.39) 
Family background very good  1.15 
(0.40) 
1.12 
(0.52) 
Resided in Santiago during primary or secondary 
school years 
 
1.34 
(0.10) 
1.67 
(0.14) 
Number of observations  4415  4515 
R‐squared  0.10  0.09 
     † In addition, the specification includes indicator variables for whether  
information on mother’s education, father’s education, region of residence 
is missing.    
†† Total number of years exposed to voucher prior between ages 6 and 18.  
 
 
 Table 4 
Multinomial Logit Model for the Probability of Choosing Subsidized or Non‐subsidized  
Primary Relative to Municipal Primary Choice 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
   
Estimated Coefficients 
 
Variable†  Subsidized 
Primary Choice 
Non‐subsidized 
Primary Choice 
Intercept  ‐2.82 
(0.34) 
‐4.55 
(0.55) 
Voucher available during    
    primary school years 
1.00 
(0.13) 
0.09 
(0.17) 
Voucher available during  
   secondary school years 
0.37 
(0.20) 
‐0.17 
(0.27) 
Mother’s education  0.006 
(0.02) 
0.09 
(0.02) 
Father’s education  0.01 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.02) 
Number of Siblings  ‐0.06 
(0.02) 
‐0.03 
(0.03) 
Family background poor  ‐0.24 
(0.29) 
0.10 
(0.48) 
Family background good  ‐0.12 
(0.29) 
‐0.06 
(0.48) 
Family background very good  ‐0.01 
(0.37) 
0.21 
(0.57) 
Resided in Santiago during primary or secondary 
school years 
 
1.04 
(0.09) 
1.10 
(0.14) 
Number of observations  4515 
  
   † In addition, the specification includes indicator variables for whether information on mother’s  
education, father’s education, region of residence is missing.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Decision Rule Model for Working 
Probit Model 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable†  Estimated 
Coefficient 
Intercept  ‐4.45 
(0.09) 
Years of education  0.09 
(0.002) 
Attended subsidized primary  ‐0.12 
(0.02) 
Attended nonsubsidized primary  ‐0.06 
(0.03) 
Voucher available during    
    primary school years 
‐0.38 
(0.06) 
Voucher available during  
   secondary school years 
0.09 
(0.10) 
Labor force experience (in years)  0.29 
(0.003) 
Age  0.39 
(0.006) 
Age squared  ‐0.01 
(0.0001) 
Mother’s education  ‐0.005 
(0.003) 
Father’s education  0.006 
(0.002) 
Number of Siblings  0.011 
(0.002) 
Family background poor  0.01 
(0.04) 
Family background good  0.01 
(0.04) 
Family background very good  0.03 
(0.05) 
Resided in Santiago during primary or secondary 
school years 
 
0.08 
(0.01) 
Number of observations  83377 
R‐squared  0.37 
     † In addition, the specification includes indicator variables for whether  
information on mother’s education, father’s education, family background 
poverty status, region of residence or number of siblings is missing.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6a 
Actual and simulated schooling choice distribution 
subsample not exposed to vouchers before age 15 (1818 individuals) 
(simulated choices in parentheses) 
    Secondary School Type   
    None  Municipal Subsidized Nonsubsidized  Total across all 
secondary 
Types 
Primary Type  Municipal  40.9 
(31.8) 
53.2 
(61.6) 
5.1 
(5.7) 
0.9 
(1.0) 
88.2 
(85.1) 
  Subsidized  16.3 
(14.8) 
34.1 
(38.6) 
47.4 
(40.6) 
2.2 
(5.9) 
7.5 
(10.1) 
  Nonsubsidized  5.1 
(12.5) 
38.0 
(33.3) 
11.4 
(6.3) 
45.6 
(48.0) 
4.3 
(4.8) 
 
 
 
Table 6b 
Actual and simulated schooling choice distribution 
subsample exposed to vouchers before age 15 (2699 individuals) 
(simulated choices in parentheses) 
    Secondary School Type   
    None  Municipal  Subsidized  Nonsubsidized  Total across all 
secondary 
Types 
Primary Type  Municipal  25.5 
(25.3) 
59.0 
(64.0) 
13.8 
(9.2) 
1.9 
(1.5) 
77.9 
(80.5) 
  Subsidized  6.1 
(9.8) 
30.6 
(32.0) 
57.6 
(52.9) 
5.7 
(5.9) 
17.0 
(15.3) 
  Nonsubsidized  2.9 
(9.5) 
18.12 
(28.5) 
17.4 
(9.5) 
61.6 
(48.0) 
5.1 
(4.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Actual and Simulated Schooling Attainment 
by whether exposed to voucher program before secondary school 
 
  Subsample without 
vouchers 
Subsample with 
vouchers 
Full sample 
Years of 
schooling 
Actual  Simulated  Actual  Simulated  Actual  Simulated 
5 or more  92.1  91.5  96.9  93.7  94.6  92.8 
7 or more  83.1  84.9  92.8  88.8  88.9  87.2 
9 or more  62.5  71.1  79.1  77.7  72.4  75.1 
10 or more  56.3  67.3  74.9  74.4  67.4  71.5 
11 or more  47.4  56.1  67.8  64.2  59.6  60.9 
12 or more  42.7  42.9  63.5  51.1  55.0  47.8 
13 or more  16.4  20.7  29.7  26.3  24.3  24.0 
14 or more  14.1  10.8  24.5  15.1  20.2  13.4 
15 or more  10.6  7.3  16.9  10.5  14.3  9.2 
16 or more  7.2  4.9  11.4  7.0  9.6  6.1 
17 or more  4.3  2.8  5.6  4.1  5.0  3.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Actual and Simulated Labor Force Participation Rates  
by Primary‐Secondary Schooling Choice and Age 
(Number of person‐year observations in parentheses) 
  Age 16‐25 
 
Age 26‐35  Age 36‐45 
Primary‐secondary 
schooling type 
Actual  Simulated  Actual  Simulated  Actual  Simulated 
M‐M  60.2 
(19669) 
64.3  93.9 
(13801) 
84.6  94.6 
(6268) 
89.1 
 
S‐M  45.6 
(1648) 
63.3  93.4 
(775) 
83.4  95.6 
(325) 
87.8 
NS‐M  40.6 
(529) 
52.5  90.5 
(412) 
77.1  97.5 
(246) 
83.6 
M‐S  52.9 
(3413) 
57.8  94.1 
(1926) 
85.5  93.2 
(536) 
88.5 
S‐S  42.9 
(2943) 
56.3  93.2 
(1405) 
85.1  96.5 
(439) 
88.4 
NS‐S  41.9 
(286) 
48.6  91.6 
(155) 
82.4  100 
(65) 
85.8 
M‐NS  48.1 
(480) 
61.0  90.2 
(298) 
88.5  95.3 
(108) 
91.4 
S‐NS  30.3 
(241) 
55.0  85.5 
(69) 
82.7  69.2 
(26) 
86.6 
NS‐NS  25.2 
(1118) 
46.1  92.6 
(607) 
81.7  97.7 
(268) 
87.2 
M primary only  86.9 
(11266) 
66.9  91.3 
(9246) 
77.1  89.6 
(4905) 
81.5 
S primary only  80.8 
(449) 
68.7  88.8 
(297) 
74.5  82.5 
(160) 
78.5 
NS primary only  85.9 
(78) 
55.6  84.4 
(58) 
67.1  80.6 
(31) 
70.2 
 
All Educational 
categories 
63.6  
(42120) 
 
63.2 
 
92.8 
(29049) 
 
82.6  92.8 
(13377) 
 
86.9 
M: municipal, S: subsidized private, NS: nonsubsidized private  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Actual and Simulated Mean Wages of Workers (in 2002 US Dollars) 
By Primary‐Secondary Schooling Type and Age 
 
Primary‐Secondary Schooling 
Type 
 
Age 16‐45 
  Actual Simulated 
All education types 4815 4712
Municipal‐Municipal 5040 4960
Subsidized‐Municipal 5555 6543
Nonsubsidized‐Municipal 9736 6192
Municipal‐Subsidized 5739 4473
Subsidized‐Subsidized 5651 5856
Nonsubsidized‐Subsidized 4301(64)† 5818
Municipal‐ Nonsubsidized 6252 4376
Subsidized‐ Nonsubsidized 5739 (49) † 6936
Nonsubsidized‐ Nonsubsidized 12882 7039
Municipal‐no secondary 2924 3112
Subsidized‐no secondary 3364 2843
Nonsubsidized‐no secondary 4287 2855
† These cells have relatively small numbers of observations (less than 100). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
 
Summary of Major educational reforms in Chile since 1980  
 Reform Detailed Description 
1981 Introduction of nationwide school 
voucher program  
Private subsidized schools have to accept amount of voucher as full payment of 
tuition. Voucher amount changes somewhat over the years. It decreased in real 
terms until 1990, when it increased. 
1990 Union negotiated increase 
(almost doubling) of mandatory 
minimum wage for teachers, 
applicable for 1990-2004. 
Both public and private teachers are members of the Teacher's Union, which 
negotiates over min teacher wage applicable to both public and private sector.  
Teachers in private schools can also form a school level union that negotiate 
wages over a min. level, but teachers in public schools cannot.   At the end of 
the 1990’s, there was an increase in the entrance exam scores (like SAT) of 
new teachers, which reversed a previous long-term downward trend in scores.  
1990-
2004 
Increase in school resources Achieved through increasing voucher amount and through special programs for 
schools.  
1994 Change in rules to allow public 
and private schools to impose a 
small tuition charge on top of the 
voucher 
This was allowed for private subsidized schools and, with some restrictions, for 
municipal schools. They cannot impose the charge on poor families. 
 
1996 Introduction of SNED program – 
National System of Student 
Performance Evaluation 
Within groups of comparable schools (in terms of student family background), 
identifies best 25% of schools according to the student results. These schools 
gain extra funds which are divided equally between the teachers of the school. 
Schools are designated “excellence” schools for two years.  
2000 Increase of 20% in the length of 
the school day (about 6-7 hours 
per week) with no change in the 
number of days per year.   
This reform required an expansion of many schools, because students had 
previously attended either morning or afternoon classes, which was no longer 
possible with the extended school day. Both public and private schools could 
apply for public school expansion funds and the program was gradually 
implemented. Information is available on which schools obtained these funds.  
2002 Introduction of a new federal 
teacher certification program. 
Teachers in public and private subsidized schools voluntarily submit a teaching 
portfolio (that includes video of classroom time) and take an exam. Teachers 
who receive the certification get an extra month of pay per year for ten years, 
paid for by the government.  Currently, about 5% of all teachers receive this 
certification. 
2003 New teacher evaluation program Mandatory evaluation of all public school teachers every four years that be 
used for teacher dismissal.  Public school teachers hired at the municipality 
level.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Simulated effect of voucher program on education outcomes 
by family background status 
  Complete sample† 
 
Poor Subsample††  NonPoor Subsample‡ 
  With 
Program 
Without 
Program 
 
 
Diff  With 
Program 
Without 
Program
 
 
Diff  With 
Program 
Without 
Program 
Diff 
% Attending private 
subsidized primary 
 
15.3  10.6  4.7  14.2  10.0  4.2  15.9  10.9  5.0 
% Attending private 
nonsubsidized 
primary 
 
4.3  5.0  ‐0.7  3.9  4.6  ‐0.7  4.5  5.3  ‐0.8 
% Attending private 
subsidized 
secondary 
 
15.8  10.0  5.8  14.5  9.3  5.2  16.8  10.4  6.4 
% Attending private 
nonsubsidized 
secondary 
 
4.1  4.0  ‐0.1  3.6  3.7  ‐0.1  4.3  4.4  ‐0.1 
% Attending college  26.3  21.3  5.0  23.8  19.6  4.2  27.7  22.4  5.3 
                   
25% quantile years 
of education 
  
9  8  1  9  8  1  9  8  1 
Median years of 
education 
 
12  11  1  11  11  0  12  11  1 
75% years of 
education 
13  12  1  12  12  0  13  12  1 
†Refers to sample of individuals exposed to voucher program at any point in their schooling careers. 
†† Refers to subsample that reported family background as indigent or poor. 
‡Refers to subsample that reported family background as good or very good. 
 
Table 12 
Voucher Impact on Education Distribution 
    Percent Completing at least x years of schooling 
  Complete sample† 
 
Poor Subsample††  NonPoor Subsample‡ 
Years of 
schooling 
With 
Program 
Without 
Program 
 
 
Diff  With 
Program 
Without 
Program
 
 
Diff  With 
Program 
Without 
Program
Diff 
4   96.5  95.3  1.2  96.6  95.5  1.1  96.6  95.2  1.4 
5   93.7  91.4  2.3  93.7  91.7  2.0  93.7  91.2  2.5 
6  93.7  91.4  2.3  93.7  91.7  2.0  93.7  91.2  2.5 
7  88.8  84.9  3.9  88.6  85.1  3.5  88.9  84.7  4.2 
8  88.8  84.9  3.9  88.6  85.1  3.5  88.9  84.7  4.2 
9  77.7  71.5  6.2  76.8  71.1  5.7  78.2  71.7  6.5 
10  74.4  67.7  6.7  73.3  67.1  6.2  75.1  68.0  7.1 
11  64.2  56.7  7.5  62.1  55.2  6.9  65.4  57.6  7.8 
12  51.1  43.7  7.4  48.2  41.5  6.7  52.7  44.9  7.8 
13  26.3  21.4  4.9  23.8  19.6  4.2  27.7  22.4  5.3 
14  15.1  11.4  3.7  13.1  10.0  3.1  16.2  12.2  4.0 
15  10.5  7.8  2.7  8.9  6.7  2.2  11.4  8.4  3.0 
16   7.0  5.2  1.8  5.9  4.4  1.5  7.6  5.6  2.0 
17  4.1  3.0  1.1  3.4  2.5  0.9  4.5  3.3  1.2 
†Refers to sample of individuals exposed to voucher program at any point in their schooling careers, over ages 15‐45. 
 †† Refers to subsample that reported family background as indigent or poor 
‡Refers to subsample that reported family background as good or very good. 
 
Table 13 
Voucher Program Impact on Labor Market Outcomes  
(Earnings and Labor Force Participation) 
  Complete sample†  Poor Subsample††  NonPoor Subsample‡ 
  With 
Program
Without 
Program 
 
 
With 
Program 
Without 
Program 
 
 
With 
Program 
Without 
Program 
Mean earnings 
      ages 16‐25 
 
3019 
 
2772 
 
2943 
 
2726 
 
3065 
 
2799 
      ages 26‐35  6422  5885  6295  5818  6496  5924 
      ages 36‐45  6879  6463  6690  6317  6990  6549 
     ages 25‐45  4975  4615  4842  4521  5053  4670 
Percent of time participate 
in the labor force 
     ages 16‐25 
 
 
63.3 
 
 
62.5 
 
 
65.7 
 
 
65.1 
 
 
61.9 
 
 
60.9 
     ages 26‐35  83.7  80.7  85.0  82.5  82.9  79.7 
     ages 36‐45  86.8  85.1  87.8  86.3  86.3  84.5 
     ages 15‐45  77.9  76.1  79.5  77.9  77.0  75.0 
†Refers to sample of individuals exposed to voucher program at any point in their schooling careers, over Ages 16‐45. 
†† Refers to subsample that reported family background as indigent or poor. 
‡Refers to subsample that reported family background as good or very good. 
 
 
 
Table 
Estimated Parameter Values 
Parameter  Estimate Estimate
Ln Wage constant 
Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
 
6.31
6.93 
5.625 
Rental rate on 
municipal secondary 
post‐voucher  
)( 22 γβ +  
 
0.073
Rental rate on municipal primary 
pre‐voucher   )( 1β  
0.009 Rental rate on private 
subsidized secondary 
pre‐voucher  ( 2Sβ ) 
 
0.0845
Rental rate on municipal primary 
post‐voucher   )( 11 γβ +  
0.0175 Rental rate on private 
subsized secondary 
post‐voucher  
( 22
SS γβ + ) 
 
0.0904
Rental rate on private subsidized 
primary pre‐voucher  ( 1Sβ ) 
 
0.021 Rental rate on private 
nonsubsidized 
secondary pre‐voucher  
( 2
NSβ ) 
 
0.086
Rental rate on private subsized 
primary post‐voucher  
( 11
SS γβ + ) 
 
0.0305 Rental rate on private 
nonsubsized secondary 
post‐voucher  
( 22
NSNS γβ + ) 
 
0.0921
Rental rate on private 
nonsubsidized primary pre‐
voucher  ( 1NSβ ) 
 
0.027 Experience
)( 3β  
0.1435
Rental rate on private 
nonsubsized primary post‐
voucher  ( 11 NSNS γβ + ) 
 
0.034 Experience squared
)( 4β  
0.003
Rental rate on municipal 
secondary pre‐voucher   )( 2β  
 
0.067 Rental rate on years of 
college education 
)( 5β  
0.0957
 
 
 
Additional rental rate 
on years of college 
education if non‐sub 
primary and secondary  
schooling 
 
0.002
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter  Estimate  Estimate 
Utility public primary 
school 
   Type 1 
   Type 2 
   Type 3 
 
832 
439 
295 
Utility (Net cost) of 
attending college 
  Type 1 
   Type 2 
   Type 3 
 
‐200 
935 
1180 
Utility subsidized 
primary school 
   Type 1 
   Type 2 
   Type 3 
 
4164 
3668 
3519 
Utility from Staying 
Home 
   Type 1 
   Type 2 
   Type 3 
 
 
‐227 
3850 
1276 
Utility nonsubsidized 
primary school 
   Type 1 
   Type 2 
   Type 3 
 
2209 
2131 
2055 
Net cost of primary 
nonsubsidized school 
‐22.5 
Net cost of primary 
subsidized school 
‐42.5 
 
 
Table 
Parameter Estimates Related to Schooling and Job Finding Costs 
Parameter  Estimate  Parameter Estimate 
Cost of attending 
municipal  school from 
outside of Santiago 
‐31.5  Cost of finding first job 
if did not attend college 
1038 
Cost of attending 
subsidized  school from 
outside of Santiago 
‐170.5  Cost of finding first job 
if did attend college 
‐1200 
Cost of attending non‐
subsidized  school from 
outside of Santiago 
‐167.5  Cost of attending 
college from outside of 
Santiago 
‐86.5 
 
 
Table 
Costs of changing from primary to secondary 
 
                            
Primary 
 
secondary 
Municipal Subsidized Non-subsidized 
Municipal -1273 -600 -650 
Subsidized -1400 -10 -500 
Non-subsidized -1450 -200 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 
Parameter Estimates Related to Variances of Shocks 
Parameter Estimate
Std. error of ln wage 
error term 
0.54
Std. error of preference 
shock for public school 
549
Std. error of preference 
shock for private 
subsidized school 
290
Std. error of preference 
shock for private 
nonsubsidized school 
197
Std. error of preference 
shock for college 
1810
 
 
Table  
Estimated Coefficients Related to Determinants of Type Probabilities 
Type 1 Probability    Type 2 Probability
Parameter  Estimate Parameter Estimate 
Constant term 
 
3.04 Constant term
 
2.39
Father’s education 
 
‐0.039 Father’s education
 
‐0.050 
Mother’s education 
 
‐0.091 Mother’s education
 
0.080
Numbers of siblings 
 
‐0.21 Numbers of siblings
 
0.185
Family background 
 
0.11 Family background
 
0.051
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Figure 4: Perc. Working by Age and Type of Primary School
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Figure 5: Smoothed Earnings−Age Relationship by Education Class and Schooling Type
